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The Law Applicable to a
Derivative Action on Behalf of a
Foreign Corporation -Corporate

Law in Conflict
Yaad Rotem'
In corporate law, the derivative action mechanism allows minority
shareholders and, in certain jurisdictions, single directors or even creditors
to file and litigate on behalf of the corporation a lawsuit against an insider
or a third party whose action has allegedly injured the corporation. The
derivative action is a mechanism that corporate law furnishes to tackle
agency problems because the corporate insiders who should initiate such
claims occasionally become caught in a conflict of interests. Obviously,
each jurisdiction decides whether to employ a derivative action mechanism
and on what terms. However, in a globalized world that offers many attractive places in which investors can incorporate their businesses, corporate
law regulation has become increasingly affected by surrounding regulatory
environments. In many respects, conflict-of-laws rules manage the interaction between local and foreign regulatory rules. The purpose of this Article
is to discuss the regulation of derivative actions when this mechanism is
evoked in the context of a foreign corporation. This rather common scenario creates a choice-of-law question: should the terms and conditions for
filing a derivative action on behalf of a foreign corporation (as opposed to
the cause-of-action itself) be regulated by the law of the forum or by the law
of the place of incorporation? For example, should the forum court enable
plaintiffs to rely on the forum's local derivative action mechanism when the
foreign law of the place of incorporation rules out completely the possibility of derivative actions being filed? This Article analyzes the doctrinal
contexts that may serve as a legal platform for resolving this question, as
well as the relevant considerations to be taken into account. The Article
subsequently argues that, in contrast to a prevailing perception, the law of
incorporation should not always be applied. It is further argued that the
public policy doctrine, rather than any other doctrinal context, is best
suited to serve as a platform for adjudicating the choice-of-law question
and that forum shopping concerns should be excluded from this question
and confined to the context of jurisdiction ascertainment.

T Visiting Scholar, Center for the Study of Law & Society, University of California,
Berkeley, School of Law; Assistant Professor, Center of Law & Business, Israel.
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Introduction
In a globalized world that offers many attractive places where investors
can incorporate their businesses, corporate law regulation becomes
increasingly affected by conflict-of-laws (private international law) rules.
Indeed, a closely kept secret among conflict of laws scholars concerns the
understanding that substantive laws-such as jurisdictions' corporate
codes-are only as relevant to a particular corporation and its stakeholders 1 as conflict-of-laws doctrines indicate. Neither the most explicit contractual agreement nor a specific preemptory statute of the highest order
can overcome the power of a choice-of-law rule that directs the court to
apply a different norm to a specific dispute. 2 In this sense, corporate codes
1. Corporate stakeholders include not only shareholders (or holders of an entitlement to the corporate entity's equity), but also any other person with an interest in the
corporate entity and its operations, including but not limited to creditors, employees,
suppliers, lenders, customers, and even the general public. Scholars and lawmakers
have argued for some time over whether a corporate entity should be managed for the
benefit of its shareholders only, or for the benefit of other stakeholders as well. See, e.g.,
REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAw: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 311-12 (2d ed., 2009) (describing the debate); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and
Not-So-Bad Arguments for ShareholderPrimacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1189, 1189-90 (2002)

(describing the same debate). For current purposes, however, this controversy need not
be resolved and is omitted from the discussion.
2. In the conflict-of-laws world, a specific dispute is what the atom is in the physical world. In other words, it is the basic unit of "matter" to which all judicial action
relates, such as characterization and application of a particular law. Note, however, that
in several contexts of characterization, such as the context of the substance-procedure
distinction that is discussed below, the process of characterization often targets a norm
or a rule of law rather than a specific dispute or a set of facts. See George Panagopoulos,
Substance and Procedure in Private International Law, 1 J. PRIVATE INT'L L. 69, 73-75
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and case law can only articulate norms that possess relative application
and force.
One context that demonstrates the importance of understanding the
interaction between corporate law and conflict-of-laws concerns the application of the forum's derivative action mechanism when such a suit is filed
on behalf of a foreign corporation. 3 This context should be of interest to
both local lawyers representing foreign corporations and to local investors
who invest in, or consider investing in, foreign corporations.4
In corporate law, a derivative action mechanism allows minority shareholders and, in certain jurisdictions, single directors or even creditors 5 to
file and litigate a lawsuit on behalf of the corporate entity against an
insider (e.g., a presiding or former director, officer, or controlling shareholder) or a third party whose action has allegedly injured the corporate
entity. 6 The derivative action is an essential and well-known corporate gov(2005). When a court characterizes a specific dispute, rather than a norm, it demonstrates a partisan approach because an announcement of a procedural characterization
will lead the court to immediately apply its own law while disregarding the contents of
the foreign law. See id. at 70. However, characterizing a norm, rather than a specific
dispute, demonstrates a multi-sided approach because a court will not ignore the foreign
law unless its norm is announced as "procedural." Moreover, note that another problem
concerns the question of what should be characterized-a single rule or a "package" of
rules. See Janeen M. Carruthers, Damages in the Conflict of Laws- The Substance and
Procedure Spectrum: Harding v. Wealands, 1 J. PRIVATE INT'L L. 323, 327 (2005) (discussing the problem as it manifests in Hardingv. Wealands and advocating an "unpacking"
approach).
3. Thus, this Article does not address questions of jurisdiction but only of choiceof-law.
4. For U.S. lawyers and legal scholars, this Article offers a comparative perspective
by envisioning the "traditional" conflict-of-laws legal framework of non-U.S. common
law and European jurisdictions. However, for readers interested in a normative analysis
of U.S. law, the Article makes note, whenever relevant, of the different choice-of-law
methodology employed by many U.S. states. See, e.g., infra note 16 (making note of
different rules between jurisdictions). Consider the difference between the "traditional"
choice-of-law methodology, which prevails in Europe and in many common-law jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and the "modern" choice-oflaw methodology, which many U.S. states have widely adopted. In short (and being
highly simplistic), the "traditional" choice-of-law methodology relies on a neutral process of choice-of-law, which starts with characterization (e.g., torts), moves on to finding
the related connecting factor (e.g., place of the wrong), and later localizes it to derive the
applicable law (deciding that jurisdiction X was the location of the wrong and thus its
laws should apply). In this rather mechanical process, policy considerations cannot be
employed in the face of the concrete litigated case and are restricted to the ex-ante formulation of a connecting factor. In contrast, the "modern" choice-of-law methodology
(such as the theories of the Most Significant Relationship or Governmental Interest Analysis) relies on a more open judicial pursuit of various policy considerations. For a thorough discussion and analysis of the differences between the two methodologies, see
generally DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS (8th
ed., 2010); SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAw REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FuTURE (2006).
5. See, e.g., ARAD REISBERG, DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORY AND OPERATION 204-06 (2007) (mentioning Canada and Israel as examples).
6. See generally A. J. BOYLE, MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS' REMEDIES (2002); DEBORAH A.
DEMOTr,

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE AcTIONs: LAW AND PRACTICE 1-3

(2011).

Note the

following: First, the derivative action is a representative action, i.e., it is a claim filed by
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ernance device, 7 the purpose of which is to ensure that agency problems
that inherently trouble corporations do not hamper attempts to obtain
redress from wrongdoers whose actions have injured the corporation.8
However, the question is whether disputes concerning the terms and
conditions for filing a derivative action on behalf of a foreign corporation
(as opposed to the question of whether a cause-of-action exists) 9 should be
regulated by the law of the forum (in conflict-of-laws jargon: lex fori) or by
the law of a foreign jurisdiction. 10 Usually the possible alternatives from
which each jurisdiction chooses are either (1) the law of the foreign jurisdiction in which the relevant corporate entity has incorporated (called lex
incorporationis),or (2) the law of the jurisdiction in which the corporate
entity has its principal place of business (called the law of the real seat).'"
A on behalf of B. Second, while a class action is also a representative action, the derivative suit asserts a claim of injury suffered by the corporate entity itself, while the class
action asserts a claim of injury suffered by the shareholders in person. However, drawing a line between these two kinds of claims is not always easy and may require a somewhat arbitrary decision. Third, while of course varying from one jurisdiction to another,
the terms for filing a derivative action usually differ from those necessary to filing an
ordinary civil action. To be sure, because the derivative action is a representative action,
lawmakers usually include certain safeguards to ensure that those represented are not
deprived. For example, in many jurisdictions court approval is required before a derivative action is allowed to proceed. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (U.S.); Civil Procedure
(Amendment) Rules 2000 S.I. 221 (L.1.) § 19.9(3) (Eng. & Wales); see also Companies
Act, c. 46 2006, § 261 (U.K.).
7. See Harald Baum & Dan W. Puchniak, The Derivative Action: An Economic, Historical and Practice-OrientedApproach, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1-2 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012) (describing the
derivative action as a "global phenomenon").
8. See REISBERG, supra note 5, at 1-2, 18-19, 20-24. For a formal model of the
agency problem, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305, 313-19,
331-32 (1976). Basically, an agency problem is created whenever A, who has some
control over B's property, also has an interest different than B's but is better informed
than B regarding the use of the property.
9. Indeed, most jurisdictions adhere to a choice-of-law rule applying the law of the
state of incorporation or the law of the real seat of the corporation, thereby allowing
foreign law to regulate the existence of a cause-of-action. See, e.g., Konamaneni v. Rolls
Royce Indus. Power (India) Ltd., [2001] EWHC (Ch) 979, [31], [34], [37], [42]-[48]
(Eng. & Wales); see also DEMOTT, supranote 6, at 212 (discussing the law in various U.S.
states).
10. This is, of course, a choice-of-law question that should be discerned from a possible choice-of-forum query. For example, in recent years U.S. corporations have begun
to adopt choice-of-forum clauses in their governance documents that require plaintiffs
whose lawsuits are either derivative or concern the internal affairs of the corporation to
initiate the litigation in a particular forum. See DEMOrr, supranote 6, at 37-40 (discussing relevant cases and possible limitations on the adoption of such provisions). However, forum selection provisions do not preclude the need to resolve the choice-of-law
question discussed in this Article. To the extent that courts enforce such provisions, the
immediate result will be the resolution of the choice-of-law question in accordance with
the conflict-of-laws doctrines that prevail at the agreed-upon forum.
11. See JusTIN BORG-BARTHET, THE GOVERNING LAW OF COMPANIES IN EU LAw 4-8
(2012) (discussing the theoretical controversy between the two approaches and its history); PASCHALIS PASCHALIDIS, FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

ch. 1 (James J. Fawcett ed., 2012) (discussing and comparing the two
choice-of-law rules); STEPHAN RAMMELOO, CORPORATIONS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw:
FOR CORPORATIONS
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For example, should courts enable plaintiffs to rely on the forum's local
derivative action mechanism when the corporate entity in question is incorporated under a foreign law that completely rules out the possibility of
derivative actions being filed?1 2 Other examples of this choice-of-law question are abundant because different jurisdictions have different prerequisites for launching a derivative action.' 3
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 11-20 (2001) (discussing the differences between the two alter-

native approaches); Werner F. Ebke, The "Real Seat" Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate
Laws, 36 INT'L L. 1015, 1015-16 (2002) (explaining the theoretical foundations of the
"real seat" doctrine); Christian Kersting, Corporate Choice of Law: A Comparison of the
United States and European Systems and a Proposalfor a European Directive, 28 BROOK. J.
INT'L. L. 1, 1-2 (2002) (comparing the United States and the European Union); Symeon
C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2004: Eighteenth Annual Survey,
52 AM. J. Comp. L. 919, 989 (2004) (describing the lex incorporationisapproach in the
United States). In those cases in which the corporation's principal place of business is
the forum state itself, a possible conflict-of-laws question would emerge only if the
forum is one that adheres to a lex incorporationisapproach.
12. See, e.g., Batchelder v. Kawamoto, 147 F.3d 915, 916-17, 921 (9th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 446 (involving a derivative action filed in the United States by an
American holder of American Depository Receipts-receipts representing ownership of
equity shares in a foreign company issued against ordinary shares held in custody by a
third party-representing ownership rights in a Japanese corporation); City of Harper
Woods Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Olver, 577 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D.D.C. 2008) (involving a derivative action filed in the United States by an American holder of American Depository
Receipts issued in relation to a U.K. corporation headquartered in London); In re Tyco
Int'l, Ltd., 340 F. Supp. 2d 94, 95-96, 98, 102 (D.N.H. 2004) (involving a derivative
action filed in the United States by an American shareholder on behalf of a company
reincorporated in Bermuda); Wilson v. ImageSat Int'l N.V., No. 07 C 6176, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 57897, at *13-16 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2008) (involving a derivative action
filed in Israel by Israeli minority shareholders of a company incorporated in the Dutch
Antilles for tax purposes against the company's controlling shareholders and officers, all
of whom were also residents of Israel. The complaint against the defendants focused on
allegations of misconduct by the defendants that inflicted serious economic damage on
the company).
13. Thus, other specific disputes that may be the subject of a choice-of-law inquiry
in the context of the derivative action mechanism include, but are not limited to, the
following factors. First, the nature of the requirement that the plaintiff maintain continuous ownership of the corporate entity's shares throughout the litigation of the derivative action. Second, the plaintiffs entitlement to file a double derivative action-an action
on behalf of a subsidiary corporation-rather than on behalf of the corporation itself.
See DEMOTT, supra note 6, at 209-10, 215 (discussing relevant cases displaying interstate and inter-country conflict-of-laws questions). Third, the nature and terms of the
demand requirement, i.e., the requirement that the plaintiff prove that the corporate
entity's directors wrongfully rejected her demand to act themselves in order to obtain
redress on behalf of the corporate entity. See, e.g., Lewis v. Dicker, 459 N.Y.S.2d 215
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982). Fourth, the nature and terms of the contemporaneous ownership
requirement, i.e., the required proof from the plaintiff of ownership of the corporate
entity's shares at the time of the wrong. See, e.g., Pessin v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 586
N.Y.S.2d 584, 586 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Zhong Zhang, The Shareholder Derivative
Action and Good CorporateGovernance in China: Why the Excitement is Actually for Nothing, 28 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 174, 177 (2011) (describing a 1% minimum shareholding
requirement under Chinese law). Fifth, the questions of litigation costs and attorneys'
fees and who should bear these costs. Sixth, the requirement that the plaintiff post some
kind of collateral as a condition for filing a derivative suit. See Ann M. Scarlett, Investors
Beware: Assessing Shareholder Derivative Litigation in India and China, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L
L. 173, 184, 207-08 (2012) (discussing different derivative action mechanisms in the
United States, India, and China). Seventh, the terms of a "good faith" requirement,
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Moreover, how should the forum court approach this question?
According to the conflict-of-laws doctrine of many jurisdictions in the
United States and worldwide, when investors decide to incorporate abroad
they subject themselves either to the law of the state of incorporation' 4 or
to the law of the corporation's real seat,' 5 depending on each jurisdiction's
pre-ordained choice-of-law rule.1 6 Henceforth, for reasons of convenience
only, both shall be referred to as lex incorporationis. Notwithstanding the
exact choice-of-law methodology to which the relevant forum adheres, the
foreign lex incorporationisusually regulates all matters and relationshipsto be accurate, all specific disputes litigated ex-post before the forum-that
are characterized as the "internal affairs" of the corporate entity.' 7 Such
affairs include "matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders . . . .".1
For example, the law of the state of incorporation will regulate specific
disputes concerning voting,' 9 capital rights, corporate governance, and
focusing on the plaintiffs behavior and motivation to sue. See, e.g., Jennifer Payne,
"Clean Hands" in Derivative Actions, 61 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 76, 80-82 (2002). Eighth, the
terms of a "best interests of the corporation" test, which examines whether a derivative
action is in the best interests of the corporate entity or whether it is justified from a costbenefit perspective. See, e.g., Zhang, supra, at 185-86.
14. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 296-300, 303-310
(1971) (discussing the U.S. perspective); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 15.05(c) ("This Act
does not authorize this state to regulate the organization or internal affairs of a foreign
corporation authorized to transact business in this state.").
15. See, e.g., RAMMELOO, supra note 11, at 10 (describing the European perspective).
The law of the real seat is usually defined as referring to the place where the central
management decisions are implemented on a day-to-day basis. See Ebke, supra note 11,
at 1016.
16. The discussion will proceed based on the assumption that the forum jurisdiction
applies lex incorporationis to specific disputes characterized as "internal affairs of the
corporation." Of course, if the forum applies instead the law of the corporate entity's
"real seat" to such disputes, the discussion in this Article should be amended accordingly, although the analysis and the normative arguments it puts forward are not
expected to change much. Indeed, the Article discusses foreign corporate entities. In
jurisdictions that apply the law of the real seat to the internal affairs of the corporate
entity, a choice-of-law question usually arises only when the corporate entity's real seat
is foreign. If the corporate entity's real seat is in the forum jurisdiction, there seems to
be no problem associated with applying the law of the forum from the beginning. Similarly, even if the corporate entity has incorporated in foreign jurisdiction A and has its
real seat in foreign jurisdiction B, the conflict-of-laws upon which the current Article
focuses is, once again, between the law of the forum and one of these foreign laws (either
A's or B's). See generally RAMMELOO, supra note 11, at 174-236 (listing European jurisdictions that apply the law of the corporate entity's "real seat").
17. See, e.g., DEMOTr, supra note 6, at 207-29; Symeonides, supra note 11, at 989.
One should keep in mind, however, that legislators can codify the application of this
foreign law to other matters, as well. See infra Part I.D.
18. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982); see also PASCHALIDIS, supra note
11, at 4 (providing a list of specific disputes which are treated in the United Kingdom as
issues of "internal affairs of the corporation").
19. See, e.g., McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 209 (Del. 1987) (applying the
law of Panama, where the corporation is incorporated, to a dispute over voting with its
shares)
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breach of fiduciary dutieS2 0 (even the existence of a cause-of-action upon
which a derivative suit may be filed), even if the dispute is litigated before
the forum. 2 ' However, questions that pertain to the derivative action
mechanism itself may be treated differently, particularly in non-U.S. jurisdictions following the traditional choice-of-law methodology.
One way to frame the question-assuming that the forum does not
employ the straightforward U.S. methodology of applying the law with the
most significant relationship to the occurrence, transactions, and parties 22 -would be to contemplate whether the appropriate characterization
of the specific dispute regarding the applicability of the forum's derivative
action mechanism (or regarding the availability of the mechanism itself) is
procedural, rather than substantive. 2 3 The resulting characterization
choice is necessary for the purpose of deciding whether foreign law should
regulate the derivative action mechanism even if the lawsuit is litigated in
the forum court (i.e., if the mechanism is characterized as substantive), or
regulated by the forum law itself (if characterized as procedural). 24
Alternatively, the availability of the forum's local derivative action
mechanism when the corporation is foreign can be dealt with not as an
"internal affairs" issue or as a substance-versus-procedure issue, but rather
as a question of public policy. 2 5 In a typical scenario, a litigant would
argue that applying the foreign derivative action law (as lex incorporationis)
is inconsistent with the forum's public policy doctrine. The public policy
doctrine (ordre public international)prevents the application of foreign law
(or judgment) inasmuch as its application is inconsistent with the forum's
"public policy," 2 6 i.e., with "some fundamental principle of justice, some
20. See, e.g., Tyco Int'l Ltd. v. Walsh, 751 F. Supp. 2d 606, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(applying the law of Bermuda, where the corporation is incorporated, to a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty).
21. Of course, specific disputes that are not characterized as "internal affairs" of the
corporate entity shall be regulated by a different law according to the forum's other
choice-of-law rules. For example, if the litigated specific dispute concerns the interpretation of a contract executed between the corporate entity and a third party (for instance,
one of its vendors), that contract would be interpreted under the auspices of the applicable law according to the forum's choice-of-law rule regarding contract interpretation.
22. For a detailed discussion of this modern, U.S.-oriented choice-of-law approach,
see CURRIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 200-24; SYMEONIDES, supra note 4, at 63-72.
23. See infra Part LB.
24. For a discussion of the substance-procedure distinction and its related choice-oflaw rule, see
AL.,

ADRIAN BRIGGS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

1 DIcEY,

CURRIE ET AL.,

MORRIS

33-36 (2002); LAWRENCE COLLINS ET
ch. 7 (14th ed., 2006);

AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

supra note 4, at 48-61; RICHARD

GARNEr,

SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN

2.17 (2012). Of course, the characterization of this dispute is a matter to be unilaterally decided by each jurisdiction according to its choice-oflaw rules.
25. See infra Part I.B.
26. See, e.g., Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co. (Nos. 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL
19, 2 AC 883 (H.L.) 972 (appeal taken from Eng.); Vervaeke v. Smith, [1983] 1 AC 145
(H.L.) 164 (appeal taken from Eng.); COLLINS, supra note 24, at 1626; see also M. Forde,
The "Ordre Public" Exception and the Adjudicative Jurisdiction Conventions, 29 INT'L &
Comr. L.Q. 259, 259-60 (1980) (discussing the various meanings and doctrines associated with public policy).
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
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prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal." 2 7 Although the doctrine is suspect as possibly generating
uncertainty due to its flexible nature,2 8 it is an escape hatch. Specifically,
the doctrine allows the forum court to avoid applying a foreign law the
outcome of which, in light of that law's contents, the court considers
unwarranted.
Yet a third alternative for framing the choice-of-law question also
exists. Rather than framing the issue as one of "internal affairs," of substance-versus-procedure, or of public policy, the question regarding the
availability of the forum's local derivative action mechanism when the corporation is foreign can be dealt with as one of extraterritorial application of
the forum derivative action statute. 2 9 Such an approach often focuses the
discussion on the doctrinal context of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Courts employ this presumption, which serves as a tool of construction, to determine the applicability of local regulations to
transnational cases, i.e., cases involving foreign elements. 3 0 Courts employ
the presumption against extraterritoriality because the language of the statute does not typically disclose the legislature's intention with regard to the
transnational context-should the local statute apply in an extraterritorial
manner or not, i.e., should it apply to any specific transnational case? 3 1 A
court determining if it should entertain a derivative action against a foreign
corporation can use the presumption against extraterritoriality to interpret
the forum's derivative suit statute to limit its application to local corporations, thereby excluding foreign incorporated entities.
The goal of this Article is to outline the methodological disposition of
possible specific disputes concerning the derivative action mechanism
27. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
28. See, e.g., Alex Mills, The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law,
4 J. PRIVATE INT'L L. 201, 202-03 (2008).
29. See infra Part I.C.

30. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010)
("When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has
none.").
31. See, e.g., Daniel S. Kahn, The CollapsingJurisdictionalBoundariesof the Antifraud
Provisions of the U.S. Securities Laws: The Supreme Court and Congress Ready to Redress
Forty Years of Ambiguity, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 365, 371-81 (2010); Jeffrey A. Meyer,
Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S.
Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 114 (2010). One could either wonder why this anomaly

persists or conclude that legislatures created it intentionally. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227,
231-33 (1958) (describing how legislators fail to concern themselves with international
applications of their laws). Of course, this is not always the case. In the United States,
several states have "outreach statutes" that, in exceptional contexts, subject foreign corporations "doing business" at the forum to local regulation rather than to the lex
incorporationis. Mostly, these exceptional contexts include disclosure of information
about the corporation and service of process for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction
over it. Occasionally, "outreach statutes" may be broader. For example, New York
enacted a statute that explicitly applies local law to certain specific disputes that otherwise would be characterized as "internal affairs" of the corporate entity, such as liability
of directors and officers. See DEMOT, supra note 6, at 215-19; Kersting, supra note 11,
at 25-36.
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when a conflict of laws transpires in the broad sense. The emphasis on
"the broad sense" refers to a possible regulatory clash, rather than to the
technical choice-of-law question itself. Indeed, either the law of the forum
or the law of the foreign jurisdiction under which the foreign corporation
has incorporated typically regulates any case that raises the question of
allowing a derivative action to proceed against a foreign corporation. Applying either regulation means rejecting the other.3 2
This Article introduces the possible conflict-of-laws doctrines that may
serve, alternatively, as a platform for adjudicating and resolving the specific dispute concerning the appropriate derivative action mechanism.
Three normative arguments are therefore put forward. First, the decision
with regard to the choice of a derivative action mechanism is certainly not,
as some might argue, one-dimensional. The argument specifically suggests
refraining from across-the-board acceptance of the proposition that the
choice of investors to incorporate abroad should unequivocally subject
them to the application of the law of incorporation on all matters concerning intra-firm relations, including the nature and terms of the derivative
action mechanism.
Second, from a choice-of-law methodology viewpoint, the public policy doctrine appears to be the better platform for resolving the dispute concerning the applicability of local derivative action mechanisms when such
lawsuits are filed on behalf of foreign corporations. The public policy doctrine evolved as an exception in cases where foreign law is prima facie
applicable and has recently been constrained along several limiting contours. Consequently, the public policy doctrine best fits the task.
Third, the Article explains why any possible problem of forum shopping should not influence the choice-of-law process. Instead, such
problems should be solved with jurisdictional rules.
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows: Part I lays out the
relevant conflict-of-laws doctrines. This part describes the broader context
within which the relevant doctrines are evoked and sets the necessary background for the normative discussion in Part II. Part I also introduces the
substance-procedure distinction, followed by a brief description of the wellknown public policy doctrine and a short primer on extraterritoriality.
Given this background, Part II deliberates on the question of choice-of-law
with regard to the derivative action mechanism. The purpose, of course, is
to decide which regulation the forum court should employ: local or foreign.
Subsequently, Part II discusses the three aforementioned arguments. A
conclusion follows.

32. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165, 169
(2004) (noting that extraterritorial application of U.S. law is expected to interfere with
other jurisdictions' attempts to regulate, particularly with respect to events that transpire
in their own territories).
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I. The Doctrinal Setting
A. A Note on Framing
In a private ordering scenario, a "clash" between regulations can translate into one of two adjudicative paths and correlated legal discussions,
depending on the circumstances of each case. The first possible path leads
the court to resolve a choice-of-law question. Sometimes the forum court is
confronted with a question concerning the law applicable to a specific dispute litigated by the parties because each evokes a different law and argues
for application of that law to solve the specific dispute. For example, the
forum court may be called to decide which law applies to determine
whether a particular condition is required, as a matter of law, to file a
derivative action. A choice-of-law conflict would arise to the extent that the
law of the forum and the law of the place of incorporation set different
terms as a condition for filing a derivative action, and each litigant argues
for the application of the law favorable to him.
The second possible path to adjudicating conflicting regulations
originates in the context of extraterritoriality. Occasionally, rather than
being asked to determine which of two possible laws-e.g., the law of the
forum and a foreign law-is applicable to a specific dispute, the forum
court may be called only to apply its own law, albeit in an "extraterritorial"
manner. To illustrate with an example from a slightly different context: an
American court may be called upon to apply § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to a case involving foreign parties and transactions.3 3 Under such a setting, the question to be adjudicated becomes one
of extraterritorial application of forum law without any of the parties arguing for application of a foreign law. In other words, the forum court in this
last scenario is only asked to interpret a local statute to determine its applicability in an international context.
Note, however, that even when the court adjudicates the discussion as
a question of extraterritoriality, there always exists an implied, and un-litigated, choice-of-law question. To begin with, there is the issue of the difference between the various laws concerned. Indeed, if the forum court is
asked by a plaintiff to apply § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to a case involving foreign parties and transactions, it is only because the
relevant foreign law, in the general sense, 3 4 is different from § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and does not offer the plaintiff as
favorable a cause of action as the one offered by § 10(b). The defendant in
such cases does not argue, of course, for the application of the foreign
securities law-as the defendant does not seek to be liable at all-but
instead she argues that § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does
not apply to the case because it has no extraterritorial application. Fur33. See, e.g., In re Nat'l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL
3844463, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006) (the trial court's decision in the Morrison
litigation).
34. This reservation is added to clarify that a difference in laws exists even if it
derives from practical, rather than formal, issues; for example, foreign courts tend to
award lower compensation in securities fraud cases than local courts.
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thermore, if the forum court decides not to apply the local regulation (e.g.,
a U.S. court decides not to apply § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to a case involving Australian parties and transactions), then the
direct consequence of such a ruling is to allow the relevant foreign law,
rather than U.S. law, to regulate the situation. In other words, U.S. law
withdraws to make room for the foreign regulation to apply. This consequence is the case even if no subsequent litigation, foreign or other, commences at all.
Thus, before turning to ascertain the law applicable to a derivative
action filed on behalf of a foreign corporation, one needs to decide how to
frame this question from the perspective of the forum's conflict-of laws
doctrine. Obviously, when employing the modern, U.S.-oriented methodology-such as the approach that calls for applying the law with "the most
significant relationship"-there is hardly any framing problem: the court
conducts the relevant policy discussion while pursuing the law with the
most significant relationship.3 5 Moreover, when the parties bring the issue
of extraterritoriality before the court, the court will probably frame the discussion as one concerned with the extraterritorial application of the law of
the forum. However, when the parties' argument puts a traditional, rather
than modern, choice-of-law question before the court because one of the
parties evokes a foreign law, the discussion would probably occur in several other doctrinal settings.
Note in this last context that the focal point of a choice-of-law discussion, should one occur during the litigation, is not anticipated to be about
application of the law of the state of incorporation (lex incorporationis).
Indeed, the parties can easily be expected to invoke several conflict-of-laws
doctrines that override the application of lex incorporationis. At least two
doctrinal contexts can serve to frame the question of applicable law. These
doctrinal contexts are mutually exclusive, and, moreover, other than arguments by the parties that require the court's decision, it is hard to point to
any criteria according to which the court can be referred to one of these
contexts rather than to the other. One context is the substance-procedure
distinction; the second is the doctrine of public policy.
One could argue that the parties' adversary arguments will "decide"
the doctrinal context in which the court will be required to contemplate the
question of which law regulates the filing of a derivative action, whether
local or foreign. Thus, instead of attempting to resolve the framing issue,
the argument would hold that one should simply anticipate the possible
doctrinal contexts and be prepared for each. However, as will be shown in
Part II, the question of framing does have significance.
Nonetheless, before turning to a solution to the framing problem of
deciding which law should regulate the disposition of a derivative action
on behalf of a foreign corporation, the reader should first acquaint herself
with the three possible doctrinal contexts that may serve as a platform for
35. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV
547, 555-56 (1996).

332

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 46

seeking the relevant answers. These doctrinal contexts include the substance-procedure distinction, the doctrine of public policy, and the doctrine of extraterritoriality.
B. The Substance-Procedure Distinction
1.

The Doctrine

One of the most important and intriguing conflict-of-laws doctrines is
the substance-procedure distinction. Being the law of the land worldwide, 36 the doctrine directs the forum to refrain from applying foreign
norms characterized as procedural, even when the foreign law from which
they originate should be the law applicable to the dispute. Instead, the
forum is called upon to apply its own law.3 7 Employing the doctrine can
be fairly easy, as long as the issue of characterization is resolved and the
court can announce the correct characterization. Herein lies the problem,
because making the distinction between substance and procedure is a complex endeavor,3 8 even when it is understood that the court makes its
announcement only within the particular legal context of the choice-of-law
process.3 9 As in many other characterization settings, parties to the adver36. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 122 (1971); Tolofson v.
Jensen [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 (Can.), http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1994/1994
canlii44/1994canlii44.pdf; John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd. v Rogerson (2000), 203 CLR 503
(Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/highsct/2000/36.html;
COLLINS, supra note 24, at 177. One should note, however, that in civil law systems,
"procedure" is usually reserved to characterizing only issues pertaining to the actual
process the court follows. See Martin Illmer, Neutrality Matters-Some Thoughts About
the Rome Regulations and the So-Called Dichotomy of Substance and Procedurein European
Private InternationalLaw, 28 CIV. JUST. Q. 237, 238 (2009). A different model may also
exist. For example, China has recently enacted a new conflict-of-laws statute which does
not explicitly prescribe the substance-procedure distinction (with one exception that
concerns limitations). See Guangjian Tu, China's New Conflicts Code: General Issues and
Selected Topics, 59 AM. J. COMp. L. 563, 571 (2011).
37. Phrased in this manner, the doctrine could be exposed as "escape hatch" in
nature, allowing courts to avoid the application of foreign law even when such application is mandated prima facie. See CURRIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 39, 48-59 (describing
the substance-procedure distinction as one of several "escape devices"); Adrian Briggs,
The Legal Significance of the Place of a Tort, 2 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 133, 136
(2002) (indicating the tendency of courts to manipulate the substance-procedure distinction in the absence of a formal legal exception to prevent the application of foreign
law).
38. See, e.g., Janeen M. Carruthers, Substance and Procedurein the Conflict of Laws: A
Continuing Debate in Relation to Damages, 53 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 691, 694 (2004);
Anthony Gray, Loss Distribution Issues in Multinational Tort Claims: Giving Substance to
Substance, 4 J. PRIVATE INT'L L. 279, 280-81 (2008); Panagopoulos, supra note 2, at
70-75. For an earlier observation see HERBERT F. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 158-60 (1927).

39. The distinction between substance and procedure prevails in other legal contexts, as well. For example, under U.S. law, substance must be distinguished from procedure for the purposes of the Erie Doctrine, which mandates that federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law and federal procedural
law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Retroactive effect is usually
extended only to statutes, administrative regulations, or court rulings that are "procedural," rather than "substantive." See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, FederalJurisdiction
and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 2035,
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sarial proceeding will tend to argue zealously before the court for a characterization that best serves their own personal interest in the case, thus
making the court's characterization announcement highly important.
Occasionally, the court's characterization serves as the judicial decision
that decides the entire case.
Two alternate problems undermine any effort to discover the correct
characterization in the context of the substance-procedure distinction.
Those who believe that characterizations should be neutral and can actually be derived a priori, as the traditional choice-of-law process mandates,
face the problem of distinguishing "matter" or "right of action" (which
mandate a characterization announcement of substance and application of
the lex causae, which, in practice, would be a foreign law, of course) from
"manner" or "remedy" (which mandate a characterization announcement
of procedure and respective application of the forum law).4 0 Alternatively,
those who accept the notion that characterization can almost never be
announced a priori4 ' face the problem of deciding what should be the
rationaledriving the substance-procedure distinction and then, according
to the rationale chosen, how to apply the rationale to the circumstances of
the litigated case. The methodological approach adopted in this latter alternate context is simple: characterization should be employed in a functional
manner, allowing the court to announce "substance" or "procedure"
depending on the way in which a particular characterization would better
comport with the rationale in question.4 2
2104-05 (2008). Of course, referring to a norm as substantive or procedural in one
legal context certainly does not mandate an identical characterization in the context of
conflict of laws. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) ("The line between
'substance' and 'procedure' shifts as the legal context changes."); COLLINS ET AL., supra
note 24, at 178; Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of
Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 345-46 (1933).
40. See, e.g., Harding v. Wealands [2006] UKHL 32, [36]-[37], [83] (appeal taken
from Eng.) (Lord Carswell); id. at [36]-[37] (Lord Hoffman); see also Gray, supra note
38, at 281-82 (discussing the context of a specific dispute regarding limitation periods).
41. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 39, at 343 (noting that for the purpose of characterization, one should "admit that the 'substantive' shades off by imperceptible degrees into
the 'procedural', and that the 'line' between them does not 'exist', to be discovered
merely by logic and analysis, but is rather to be drawn so as best to carry out our
purpose"). Cook also notes that the question is not where one can find the objective line
separating substance from procedure but where to draw the line. Id. at 335; see also
Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 325-36 (1990) (arguing
that characterization of substance versus procedure depends on their purpose). Further, even attempts to draw the line based on identifying the purpose of the norm-thus
distinguishing between norms that regulate behavior during litigation versus behavior
unrelated to litigation-cannot escape this difficulty because some norms do both. Consider, for example, a statute of limitations, the purpose of which is both to allow defendants to free reserved resources they kept for reasons of possible exposure to liability (a
substantive behavior) and to prevent defendants from having to defend themselves with
out-of-date evidence (a procedural behavior).
42. Adopting a rationale-based characterization to distinguish substance from procedure also solves the problem of deciding what to characterize-a specific factual dispute
or a rule of law. For a discussion of this problem, see Panagopoulos, supra note 2, at
73-75.
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The Rationales

While it is not an easy task to trace a discussion of the legitimacy of
each rationale that can mobilize the substance-procedure distinction, let
alone of the interaction between them, consider the following rationales.
Power. From a historic viewpoint, the substance-procedure distinction
was probably formed to promote a rather narrow rationale.4 3 As with any
other governmental agency, the court does not enjoy unlimited power.
This is particularly the case when the plaintiff asks the court to impinge on
the defendant's assets or rights. Thus, although the case before the court
may be entwined with foreign elements, the forum court nevertheless lacks
power to extend remedies that it is not authorized to issue by local law. In
other words, the court's collection of remedies does not expand merely
because the case before it is of an international nature. Thus, commentators have noted that "[t]he lex fori must regulate procedure, because the
court can only use its own procedure, having no power to adopt alien procedures. To some extent, at any rate, the lex fori must regulate remedies,
because the court can only give its own remedies . . . ."*4
Inconvenience. A more functional reason to explain the substance-procedure distinction is, again, a rather narrow rationale: protecting the local
court from being unduly burdened and inconvenienced by the need to
apply foreign law to certain specific disputes. 4 5 Facing the need to apply
foreign law in a particular litigation, the rationale echoes "an obvious practical necessity" 4 6 and envisions situations in which the forum is called to
apply foreign law even when application of such foreign law burdens the
court immensely.
In this context, one can depict several scenarios that the literature
addresses:
(1) The forum entertains a different procedure than the one that exists

under the lex causae. A classic example would be the issue of trial management. Consider a defendant in a judicial system in which civil litigation
takes place before a judge, who argues that the complaint against him
should be heard before a jury. To illustrate, suppose the defendant is of
foreign domicile and the complaint was filed against him for a tort that
occurred in the foreign jurisdiction, which bestows upon defendants the
right to be adjudged by a jury of their peers. Obviously, from an institutional viewpoint, the courts of forum are incapable-even physically-of conducting a trial in such manner. Thus, characterizing the issue, or dispute,

regarding trial management as procedural brings with it the application of
43. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 79; Thomas 0. Main, The ProceduralFoundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 801, 809 (2010).
44. See Boys v. Chaplin, [19711 A.C. 356, 394 (Lord Pearson).
45. See COLLINS ET AL., supra note 24, at 178 (U.K.); Cook, supra note 39, at 344
("[Our problem resolves itself substantially into this: How far can the court of the
forum go in applying the rules taken from the foreign system of law without unduly
hindering or inconveniencing itself?") (U.S.). For a detailed history of the substanceprocedure distinction, see Illmer, supra note 36, at 239-41; Main, supra note 43, at
804-11.
46. W. E. Beckett, The Question of Classification ("Qualification") in Private International Law, 15 BuT. Y.B. INT'L L, 46, 66 (1934).
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forum law and rejection of the defendant's argument.4 7 Commentators have
further argued in this context that when considering the doctrinal justification for entertaining the distinction between substance and procedure, one
should keep in mind that certain procedural norms tend to be rather complicated in themselves and that interweaving them with existing forum procedures would excessively burden the local court.4 8
(2) The forum does not have a procedure at all because the forum does
not have a cause of action to which such procedure would be attached. An
example would be a case in which the plaintiff files a complaint to the court
building his case upon a cause-of-action unknown by forum law and relying
accordingly on a special procedure, which, of course, is also unknown to the
forum.49
(3) Uncertainty as to the nature of procedure to be employed by the
forum, especially prior to the trial commencing and before the relevant lex
causae has been chosen, pleaded, and proven. In such a case, it is unclear
50
with which procedure the litigants should originally approach the court.
(4) Another situation that falls under this category of inconveniencing
the forum court concerns the issue of dpegage, which is the possible split
and application of different laws to different specific disputes that arise during a single litigation.5 1 Once courts are willing to entertain such a split, a
question arises as to which law should regulate the procedure in such litigation. Suppose, for example, that pertinent choice-of-law rules direct the U.K.
forum to apply in a particular litigation French law to one specific dispute
(e.g., a dispute regarding the question of capacity to enter a contract) and
Japanese law to another specific dispute (e.g., a dispute over the interpretation of the contract). In such a case, can either of these two foreign laws be
chosen to regulate matters of procedure, such as trial management? Even if
one would be willing to consider such an option, which calls for having the
trial management norms of one jurisdiction apply alongside the substantive
norms of a different jurisdiction, how should the forum court decide which
of the two foreign laws actually ought to apply? Should the forum court
prefer the trial management law of one of these jurisdictions to the trial
management law of the other? The inevitable conclusion that solves this
problem and makes sense is to resort to the forum law regarding matters of
procedure. 52
(5) A forum court, the caseload of which consists of many disputes that
give rise to choice-of-law questions in general and to the application of foreign law in particular, cannot be expected to apply, for instance, in one litigation a French procedure, in a second litigation a Japanese procedure, and
in a third litigation a Canadian procedure.53

However, despite the many possible scenarios, one can identify a

change occurring with regard to the scope of this rationale and the manner
47. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

MENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

H§ 122-144 (1971);

RESTATE-

§ 594 (1934).

48. See Carruthers, supra note 38, at 692.
49. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 41, at 304-05; Main, supra note 43, at 802.
50. See, e.g., Giesela Rifhl, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic
Perspective, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 42, 48-49 (2006).
51. See COLLINS ET AL., supra note 24, at 1555-58 (discussing and explaining depecage); CuRRIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 244 (discussing and explaining depecage).
52. See Gray, supra note 38, at 284.
53. See Beckett, supra note 46, at 66.
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in which it is implemented. Recent comments in the literature suggest that
courts have begun to realize that applying this rationale too widely would
frustrate conflict-of-laws principles, particularly the two goals of deterring
forum shopping (with regard to plaintiffs' selection of venues) and neutrality (with regard to the choice-of-law methodology). 5 4 In other words, being
too protective of the forum court in this context (which means that the
"procedure" tag is attached too hastily) comes with a price: the forum's
own conflict-of-laws agenda would be increasingly thwarted. In accordance with this theme, commentators have advocated for the adoption of
neutrality as a criterion for striking the substance-procedure characterization.5 5 Neutrality should be "determined by the abstract nature of the matter in question, not by reference to the concrete case." 56 To illustrate,
consider the issue of estoppel. Resorting to neutrality generates the conclusion that while estoppel-by-record should be characterized as procedural
and governed by forum law because it is intended to prevent contradictory
judicial decisions, other forms of estoppel are concerned with the decision
on the merits, as they relate to the specific dispute and should be regarded
as substantive. 5 7
Expectations. Similar to the inconvenience rationale, yet different in
principle, is the rationale of litigants' expectations. It has been argued that
the forum should apply its own law to specific disputes over procedure
because such application comports to the litigants' post-dispute expectations.58 Such a rationale particularly addresses the plaintiff, who chooses
the forum court and thus must accept the forum court's procedure.59
Efficiency. Over the years, the rationale for employing the substanceprocedure distinction has evolved in several directions. 60 One direction
can be summarized as a concern with enhancing efficient litigation. 6 1
Currently, matters of procedure are hardly considered insignificant;6 2
therefore, one would find it hard to argue that matters of procedure should
be decided according to forum law simply because they are unimportant.
It is, nevertheless, possible to argue that the application of forum law in
certain matters is justified as a means of saving the time and costs associated with applying a foreign law in a civil litigation. Indeed, a good argument can be brought in support of refraining from applying foreign law to
each trivial dispute that arises during the trial, such as the type of paper on
which the parties' arguments should be typed. In other words, this ratio54. See Gray, supra note 38, at 283 n.22; Illmer, supra note 36, at 250.
55. Illmer, supra note 36, at 246-47.
56. Id. at 246.
57. Id. at 257.
58. See Carruthers, supra note 38, at 693-94 (identifying Wolff as endorsing this
rationale).
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 43, 58 and accompanying text. See generally Carruthers, supra
note 38.
61. See Main, supra note 43, at 833.
62. See, e.g., id. at 802 (generally emphasizing that "procedural" norms are powerful
enough to undermine "substantive" rights).
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nale calls on courts to economize on the costs associated with application
of foreign law.
Efficiency in this context means simplifying as much as possible the
adjudication of the dispute and minimizing its costs. First, from the
court's viewpoint, jurists are usually unfamiliar with any foreign law under
consideration for application, and, if application is unnecessary, they
should not be forced to learn the intricacies, ideology, and other factors
relevant to that law. Such a learning process entails a waste of precious
judicial time. Moreover the choice of legal process itself may be considered
quite expensive in terms of judicial time wasted because many judges dislike this area of the law. Characterizing a norm or a specific dispute as
procedural, rather than substantive, has in practice the immediate effect of
invoking the forum law without the necessity of engaging in the choice-oflaw process.
Furthermore, when viewed from a social perspective that concerns
itself with the litigating parties' expenses, the costs of proving foreign law
can be quite significant, especially in those systems of law in which foreign
law is an issue of fact, rather than of law. 6 3 In these legal systems, proving
foreign law necessitates evidence-usually the testimony of witnesses who
are experts on the foreign law in question-that is relatively expensive to
obtain. Expert witnesses are required to submit written opinions and later
are called into court to testify on such opinions and to be crossexamined.6 4 The entire process becomes even more expensive if one of the
parties to the litigation calls as his expert witness a foreign witness, such as
a foreign law professor or a lawyer. Conventional treatment would no
doubt include the need to provide such a witness with airfare, proper hotel
accommodations, and dining. Application of foreign law may mandate
employing more than one expert witness, as litigants would like their
expert to rebut the testimony of their opponent's expert. When two
experts disagree on a matter in which the court has little understandingin this case, the contents of a particular foreign law-one can expect that
the court will react by appointing a third expert, this time on behalf of the
court.6 5
Whether the trial takes place in a system in which legal expenses cannot be shifted and parties to a civil litigation bear their own legal expenses
or in a system in which the loser at the trial bears the legal expenses, duplicate expert testimonies are socially wasteful. Assuming that the purpose of
the litigation is first and foremost to find the truth and uphold a just result
between the parties litigating, one would like to achieve these goals as
cheaply as possible.
Of course, a question arises as to how courts should guide themselves
in promoting the efficiency rationale. In other words, the question is what
criterion courts should employ to decide that a characterization of proce63. Id. at 833.
64. See generally Roger M. Michalski, Pleading and Proving Foreign Law in the Age of
Plausibility Pleading, 59 Buff. L. REv. 1207 (2011).
65. Id.
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dure is in order for reasons of efficiency. Obviously, a cost-benefit analysis
is in order. However, what kind of analysis? The case law and the literature have yet to answer that question.
Tool. Perhaps the most intriguing and controversial direction in which
the substance-procedure distinction has advanced in the conflict-of-laws
context-mostly in systems retaining the traditional choice-of-law doctrine-is usually only implicitly mentioned: the direction of policy-oriented
rationale. On several occasions, it has been posited that the court exercising the choice-of-law decision should employ the substance-procedure distinction as a tool to allow various policy considerations to be inserted into
the otherwise neutral, and thus perhaps unsatisfying, choice-of-law
process. 66
The idea underlying this rationale is to use the substance-procedure
distinction in a functional manner to manipulate the choice-of-law process.
The substance-procedure distinction, advocates argue, should be perceived
merely as a tool, the purpose of which is to enrich the choice-of-law process
with policy considerations. These policy considerations usually belong to
one of two groups: substantive policy considerations or policy considerations that concern choice-of-law methodology.6 7
To illustrate the importance of this rationale and the manner in which
courts are expected to apply it, consider a rather extreme example. Suppose a vessel documented in Panama is the subject of two types of claims
filed before the forum court by creditors of the vessel's owners. 68 Creditor
S's claim is a secured claim because a ship mortgage has been recorded in
his favor to guarantee that the underlying claim against the vessel's owner
is paid. Creditor U's claim is seemingly an unsecured claim, but Creditor
U argues that the claim arose through the act of providing the vessel with a
service (e.g., food, towing, working, etc.), the result of which arguably was
the creation of an (unrecorded) maritime lien 69 that secures payment of his
66. See Roerig v. Valiant Trawlers Ltd, [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 681, 688 ("In my view
the question whether deductions of benefits should be made is likely to be bound up
both with policy considerations and with the way in which damages under the particular head are to be assessed overall.") (Waller LJ.); Harding v. Wealands, [2007] 2 A.C. 1,
8 ("A wide definition of what is procedural tends to defeat the purpose of the law of the
country whose law is to be applied and encourages forum shopping, reduces comity and
gives rise to anomalous and unjust results . . . .") (Lord Hoffman); Hakeem Seriki, Harding v. Wealands- The Final Word on Assessment of Damages Under English Law?, 26
CJ.Q. 28, 29 (2007) ( "[A] better reason for classification [as procedural] is that an
English court must retain control over the remedies it gives to a litigant in its jurisdiction, and one way of achieving this is by only giving remedies allowed under English
law."); CA 352/87 Greifin Corp. v. Kur Sa'har Ltd., 44(3) PD 45, 76-77 [1990] (1sr.).
67. See generally Roerig, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 681.
68. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Int'l Ltd. v. Todd Shipyard Corp., [1980] 3 All E.R. 197
(P.C.) (Eng.); CA 352/87 Greifin Corp., 44(3) PD at 45.
69. A maritime lien is a statutory lien, usually unrecorded, created even in the
absence of a contractual agreement between the creditor and the debtor (the vessel's
owners), the purpose of which is to secure payments owed by the vessel's owners to his
otherwise unsecured creditors when their claims originate as a result of the vessel incurring operating expenses. Creditors holding a maritime lien can sue the vessel in rem for
its value, as well as sue its owners in personam. See generally Raymond P. Hayden &
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claim. The two creditors, whose claims against the vessel are mutually
exclusive because the total sum of the claims exceeds the vessel's net worth,
are in dispute over two specific issues. First, is Creditor Us claim indeed
secured by a maritime lien? If Creditor Us claim is not guaranteed with a
maritime lien, it is merely an unsecured claim that Creditor S's claim obviously outranks. Indeed, one can understand Creditor Us position: the
only way in which Creditor U's claim can outrank Creditor S's claim is if
Creditor Us claim is guaranteed with a maritime lien. Otherwise, Creditor
U's claim, as an unsecured claim, is to be paid only once Creditor S's claim
is paid in full (which is impossible). Second, if Creditor U's claim is indeed
secured with a maritime lien, which of the secured claims should prevail?
Does creditor S's claim outrank Creditor Us claim, or vice versa? Which of
the two claims ranks higher on the order of priorities?
Issues of choice-of-law arise as it becomes clear that with regard to
each of these specific disputes, each of the creditors holds a different position as to the law that applies. Creditor U argues that forum law applies to
the first specific dispute, thus acknowledging the claim as being secured by
a marine lien. Creditor S argues that the law of State X regulates this dispute instead, and State X law does not acknowledge a maritime lien when
the claim originates in a voluntary service rendered by the claimant to the
vessel (as opposed to a claim of an involuntary creditor, i.e., one resulting
from a tortious act). As for the second specific dispute-which concerns
the order of priorities between the two claims-Creditor U argues for the
application of a law according to which maritime liens outrank any marine
mortgage, while Creditor S argues for the application of the forum law,
which recognizes the superiority of the ship mortgage over the maritime
lien.
How should this case be decided according to the policy considerations insertion rationale? Israeli law has, for example, supplied an answer.
In a case decided by the Israeli Supreme Court in 1990, Justice Shoshana
Netanyahu introduced this rationale, ruling that both specific disputes
should be characterized as procedural and thus be decided according to
the law of the forum (which in that case, while acknowledging Creditor U
claim's secured status, mandated that it be outranked by the ship mortgage, therefore making Creditor S's claim outrank Creditor U's claim). 70
The Justice explained that the "procedure" characterization ought to be
chosen because the court should, in this particular case, take certain specific policy considerations into account. For example, in regard to the first
specific dispute concerning the question of the possible formation of a
maritime lien, the Justice ruled that at least two policy considerations call
the court to opt for a "procedure" characterization, the first of which was
the need to reduce the number of maritime liens. The Justice stated that
while the forum law-i.e., Israeli law-is known for having a minimal number of maritime liens (which, as a matter of maritime law or property law
Kipp C. Leland, The Uniqueness of Admiralty and Maritime Law: The Unique Nature of
Maritime Liens, 79 TUL. L. REv. 1227 (2005).
70. CA 352/87 Greifin Corp., 44(3) PD at 45.
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are generally considered unwarranted and to reduce overall welfare), characterizing the dispute as one of substance may result, at least in future
cases, in application of a foreign law. However, the application of foreign
law may result in the forum court acknowledging a far larger number of
maritime liens than "is warranted."71 Second, the Justice pointed to a need
to simplify the choice-of-law process. In this context, Justice Netanyahu
stated that when considering application of foreign law to the issue of creation of an entitlement, one familiar with choice-of-law methodology should
think of the next stage-ranking the entitlement according to an order of
priorities-and refrain from enabling the application of a foreign law.7 2
Indeed, the Justice explained that because the forum law should regulate
the dispute concerning the order of priorities, so should the dispute with
regard to the creation of the entitlement. Otherwise, the court might have
to decide where along the order of priorities an unfamiliar entitlement
should be ranked. Moreover, because the forum law regulates the order of
priorities, forum law should also regulate the question of whether an entitlement of some sort exists at all to prevent confusion.
One ought to note that those advocating the idea of utilizing the substance-procedure distinction as a tool to insert policy considerations into
the choice-of-law process are actually arguing for a completely open and
acknowledged manipulation of this process, one that differs immensely
from any hidden manipulation of the choice-of-law process to which critics
sometimes refer.7 3 Thus, it is argued, the court making the choice-of-law
decision should explain and disclose for review the policy considerations
that are inserted into the choice-of-law process.
C. The Public Policy Doctrine
The traditional choice-of-law process calls upon the judge to characterize the specific dispute or disputes brought before it and with regard to
each dispute follow the link associated with the resulting characterization.7 4 The judge is thus directed to apply the law of one jurisdiction to the
characterized specific dispute. However, if at the end of this process the
judge reaches the conclusion that the applicable law is foreign, he may,
nonetheless, refrain from applying that law by ruling that such an application would be inconsistent with the forum's public policy. 75
The public policy doctrine ("ordere public international")prevents the
application of foreign law (or judgment) in as much as its application is
inconsistent with what the forum considers to be "some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Boys v. Chaplin, [1971] A.C. 356, 392 ("It may be that this appeal can
be decided, quasi-mechanically, by the accepted distinction between substance and procedure ... . I have no wish to depreciate the use of these familiar tools. In skillful hands
they can be powerful and effective . . . .") (Lord Wilberforce).
74. See, e.g., BRIGGS, supra note 24, at 8-10.
75. See, e.g., COLLINS, supra note 24, at 92-100.
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rooted tradition of the common weal." 76 In other words, in the conflict-oflaws process, the public policy doctrine is the forum's way of stating that
the forum's tolerance of foreign laws (or judgments) and the forum's
respective willingness to apply them is not without limits. For example, a
particular foreign law, the application of which under the circumstances is
intolerable from the forum's viewpoint, shall not be applied. However, the
public policy doctrine also reveals that the forum is willing, at least to a
certain extent, to tolerate applicable foreign legal arrangements and regulations that differ from the forum's own standard norms. Indeed, mere difference between an applicable foreign legal norm and the forum's own
norms should ordinarily be an insufficient cause to ignore the foreign
norm and should not bring about the application of the forum's norms
instead of the foreign norm.
While always suspect due to its propensity to generate uncertainty
because of its flexible nature, 77 the doctrine is an important escape hatch,
allowing the forum court to avoid being forced to apply a foreign law
which, in light of its contents, the forum court considers unwarranted.
Some consider the public policy doctrine rather useful.7 8 Thus, an argument put forward as early as the 1940s called for replacing the substanceprocedure distinction with a wider application of the public policy doctrine. 79 Such a doctrinal replacement would eliminate the need to grapple
with the substance-procedure distinction but would, nonetheless, enable
the forum to apply its own law to the specific issue. Most legal systems,
however, have not adhered to this proposal.
Regardless, courts naturally tend to gravitate toward practical solutions to the legal problems they face, and the problem of uncertain public
policy doctrine is no different. In an attempt to transform the doctrine
into a more practical and predictable tool, a commentator has recently
argued that the public policy doctrine should continue to evolve along an
already existing trend of being employed to block applicable foreign norms
only sparingly. To that end, it has been suggested that three principles
should serve to guide the court.8 0 We consider these principles in detail
because understanding them can, at the least, shed light on the nature of
76. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918).
77. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 28, at 202-03; Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael 1.
Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 971-73, 981
(1956).
78. See, e.g., Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football Association Ltd., [1971] 1
All E.R. 215 at 219 (Lord Denning) (noting the ability of the doctrine, which was
famously compared to an "unruly horse," to "jump over obstacles.. . and come down on
the side of justice").
79. See Edmund M. Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. REv. 153,
195 (1944). Advocating a moderate version of the argument, Morgan suggests that the
law of the locus should apply to all matters of substance (except where its application
would violate the public policy of the forum) and to all matters of procedure that are
likely to have a material influence upon the outcome (except when its application will
violate the public policy of the forum or when "weighty practical considerations"
demand the application of the law of the forum).
80. See Mills, supra note 28, at 210-18.
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this doctrine. The first principle is proximity. The forum court should
examine its proximity to the specific dispute to justify the execution of
regulatory authority. For example, when the litigating parties are both foreigners who are fighting over a foreign transaction with purely foreign
implications, the forum should usually not consider itself in near enough
proximity to justify invoking public policy considerations. The second
principle is relativity. The forum court should examine the nature of the
norms from which the applicable foreign law diverges, particularly the
extent to which such norms are perceived by the forum as absolute or
merely local. For example, a foreign law violating internationally recognized human rights appears to be inherently inconsistent with the forum's
public policy, whereas a norm entertained exclusively by the laws of the
forum usually should not be considered inconsistent with the latter's public policy. The third principle concerns the seriousness of the breach. The
forum court should examine the extent of the divergence between the applicable foreign law and the protected norm. In particular, the forum court
must examine whether the breach is minor and technical or fundamental.
For example, a slight difference in the scope of money damages awarded by
the foreign law in comparison to damages usually awarded by forum law
should not generally constitute a serious breach of any norm and, thus,
should not trigger the invocation of the public policy doctrine.
D. The Presumption against Extraterritoriality
The presumption against extraterritoriality is preoccupied with the
extraterritorial application of local laws, particularly those with regulatory
purposes, to cases involving foreign jurisdictions. The doctrine calls upon
the forum court to construe local regulation as having no application
outside the territory of the forum unless a contrary legislative intent can be
inferred."' The doctrine mirrors a merger of two rules of construction:8 2
first, a rule according to which statutes should be construed not to violate
international law and, second, a rule according to which jurisdiction is
generally territorial. To better understand the presumption, consider its
theoretical foundations and the manner in which it evolved.

81. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (applying
U.S. doctrine with relation to federal statutes); see also Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law, 40 SW. L. REv. 655 (2011)
(criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision for leaving a loophole which allows extraterritorial application: the presumption can indeed be rebutted, but it can also be
declared inapplicable if shown that the case at hand is not of foreign, but rather of local,
focus); StephenJ. Choi & LindaJ. Silberman, TransnationalLitigation and Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 465 (presenting discussion before the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Morrison); Erez Reuveni, Extraterritorialityas Standing: A
Standing Theory of the ExtraterritorialApplication of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 1071 (2010) (same).
82. See William S. Dodge, Morrison's Effects Test, 40 SW. L. REv. 687, 687 (2011).
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Territoriality

One could assume a need for jurisdictions worldwide to divide
amongst themselves authority and regulation 8 3 as well as to inform people-who naturally possess tendencies to both accumulate property and
travel across borders-to which authority they answer at any given
moment. One could also accept that looking to physical borders would be
a rather simple, reasonable, and equitable way to accomplish such horizontal and vertical divisions of power.84 Thus, as early as the seventeenth century, scholars began to articulate what had already become a reality even
before: specifically, that geographical borders as a concept is a focal point
around which various power-dividing norms can be formed.8 5 A principle
of territoriality was thus enunciated to argue that "the laws of each state
have force within the limits of that government and bind all subject to it,
but not beyond."8 6 The idea of extraterritoriality was also beginning to
evolve, even if for practical reasons alone: sovereign states needed to communicate with each other using ambassadors, and embassies became preliminary islands of foreign territory that the host jurisdiction accepted.8 7
Note that these ideas have evolved in an environment in which constant tension already existed between each jurisdiction's technical ability to
become as imperialistic in its approach as it wished, notwithstanding the
practical results of such an approach, and the need of each jurisdiction to
defend itself against retaliatory behavior by other jurisdictions. For example, a legislature can, subject to constitutional limitations, act as "imperialistically" as it wishes, but must also take into account international
criticism and possible retaliation by other jurisdictions. Moreover, occasionally-for example, in most contexts of private international law-any
inter-jurisdictional tension has to be relieved not by jurisdictions conversing with one another but rather through forming norms unilaterally. 8 8
83. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to
Substance, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 932-33 (2002) (describing the growing potential for
regulatory conflicts in the modem world).
84. See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 5 (2009) (discussing territoriality as an intuitive
organizing principle); see generally John Agnew, Territoriality, in THE DICTIONARY OF
HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 744 (Derek Gregory et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009) (same).
85. For a discussion highlighting important historical aspects, see CURRIE ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 2-14 (discussing the context of private international law); RAUSTIALA,

supra note 84, at 10-12 (noting that the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 and the subsequent emergence of related ideas as a turning point in history, replaced a regime of
personal jurisdiction with a territorial one, and also discussing pre-Westphalian manifestations of territoriality).
86. CURRIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 3 (quoting a translated version of words by the
Dutch scholar Ulrich Huber); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF

7 (Keip Verlag 2007) (1834).
supra note 84, at 13.
88. For example, in the area of foreign country judgments, the United States has not
joined any bilateral or multilateral convention. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW 592 n.1 (1987) (discussing failed bilateral convention negotiations
between the United States and Great Britain); Brian R. Paige, Comment, Foreign JudgLAWS FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC

87. See

RAUSTLALA,
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To the extent that jurisdictions consider one another as equals8 9 and
would prefer not to draw fire and retaliation from other jurisdictions, there
appears to be no better criterion than territory to divide regulatory power
amongst them. Over the years, the territorial criterion has thus evolved as
a self-imposed meta-norm manifesting itself in various public and private
international law contexts as a decision-making rule. 90 For example, it is
well-known in the private international law context that jurisdiction to
adjudicate private disputes is generally territorial 91 and that the location of
an act determines the law applicable to that act. 92 It is also well-accepted
that foreign laws are assumed to apply only within the territory in which
they were enacted. 93 Finally, it is also well-acknowledged in both private
and public international law contexts that Congress's jurisdiction to legislate (i.e., prescriptive jurisdiction) is also territorial and that laws should
be construed in accordance with a presumption against extraterritoriality.9 4 This latter canon is particularly important because it usually serves
as the legal framework within which decisions by courts on the extraterritorial application of economic regulation are made. A typical case brought
before the courts involves a set of facts with mixed foreign and domestic
contacts and an assertion by a plaintiff that a specific norm dictated by the
local economic regulation web applies, thus awarding the plaintiff with a
cause of action. 95
2.

Why Territoriality?

Various rationales for employing the territorial criterion have been
offered over the years. These rationales mainly work in two directions.
First, to impose on the local courts a regime of compliance with the norms
of international law or with the interests of other jurisdictions. Rationales
using this line of thought are meant to restrain the forum from becoming
ments in American and English Courts: A ComparativeAnalysis, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 591,

622 (2003).
89. See, e.g., Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812).
90. Note, however, that Congress may rebut these rules.
91. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877). Again, legislatures can override
this limitation, subject to constitutional constraints. See also Int'l Shoe v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
92. See, e.g., KERMIT ROOSEVELT,

III,

CONFLICT OF LAWS 6-12 (2010) (discussing the

choice of law rules of lex loci delicti commissi and lex contractus).
93. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722-23; see
also Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance & Gen. Mut. Life Assurance Soc'y, [1938 A.C. 224 (P.C.) (appeal taken from N.Z.)
94. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). See also
David L. Sloss et al., International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL

(David L. Sloss et al.
eds., 2011) (noting that the presumption against extraterritoriality is a merger of the
canon that statutes should be construed not to violate the law of nations (Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804)) and the rule according to which jurisdiction is generally territorial).
95. When the plaintiff is a private agent, and the lawsuit is of a civil nature, regulation is decentralized and accomplished in a private ordering regime. When the "plaintiff'
is an administrative or a law enforcement agency and the "lawsuit" concerns administrative or criminal proceedings, regulation is administrative.
LAw IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 7, 37-38
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too imperialistic in its approach to regulation of transnational activities.
This rationale is a school of thought demonstrating understanding and tolerance for the needs of both other jurisdictions and the general international order. 9 6 For example, one of the rationales supporting the
presumption against extraterritoriality is comity.97 Another justification
for the presumption is the prevention of unintentional discord with other
jurisdictions. 98 It has been emphasized that the territorial criterion, due to
its formal and rigid nature, possesses the potential to prevent overlapping
regulation. 9 9 Extraterritorial application of forum law, however, would
interfere with attempts by other jurisdictions to regulate in particular
events that take place in their own territory.' 00 Some view the territorial
criterion as a spontaneous measure employed to restrain civil justice systems, such as the American one, that are known for granting private plaintiffs relatively high awards. 0 1
It should be noted, however, that there has been a change in the extent
to which these rationales have maintained their persuasiveness. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted the irrelevance of these rationales in
its deliberations, making clear that the presumption against extraterritoriality "applies regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the
American statute and a foreign law."' 0 2 Moreover, an approach respecting
other jurisdiction's regulatory interests sometimes creates a regulatory gap
because not all jurisdictions have an appropriate regulatory regime
addressing, for example, anti-competitive behavior.' 0 3
A second and perhaps more persuasive 0 4 direction in which legal
rationalization evolved was to echo a predisposition to focus on one's own
internal affairs. For example, one of the rationales for the presumption
against extraterritoriality in this school is that the legislator is mainly con96. See e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-65
(2004).
97. See Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 356; see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.
(Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
98. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
99. See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism,39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 123 (1998).
100. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165, 169
(2004); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1925).
101. See Paul B. Stephan, Empagran: Empire Building or Judicial Modesty?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 94, at 553,
554-55.
102. Morrison v. Nat'l AustI. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-78 (2010); see also
William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,16 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 85, 114 (1998) (noting that modem international law allows jurisdictions to
extend local laws in an extra-territorial manner).
103. See Ralf Michaels, Empagran's Empire: International Law and Statutory Interpretation in the U.S. Supreme Court of the Twenty-First Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 94, at 533, 542.
104. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-78 (noting that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies even in cases in which a conflict between U.S. and a foreign law
exists). However, it has been suggested that this line of reasoning is "teleological" and,
therefore, it is unclear what in fact justifies the presumption against extraterritoriality.
See Michaels, supra note 103, at 540.
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cerned with domestic issues. 0 5 While the precise motive for such disposition has not been specifically explained, clearly it has to do with
conserving scarce regulatory resources,1 0 6 or with a more vague philosophical idea of minding your own business while letting others mind their
own. Another rationale concerns the integrity of the forum jurisdiction's
foreign relations.10 7 The idea is that rather than being merely respectful of
other jurisdictions' interests, the forum should behave cautiously and
refrain from excessive extraterritoriality to serve its own purpose of maintaining stable foreign relations. Another argument focuses on the role of
courts in the political system, contending that a narrow territorial
approach may be to avoid international criticism of a policy shaped by a
court without the participation of the political branches. 08 Moreover, it
has been suggested that a legislature should exclusively control the extraterritorial application of its laws; thus, courts should, for the most part,
adopt a deferential position, which the presumption against extraterritoriality allows them to take.1 0 9
3.

Versions of Territoriality

A territorial criterion attempting to localize a particular set of factsmostly in cases demonstrating a mixture of both domestic and foreign contacts-is not always easy to apply, particularly in a globalizing and technologically advanced world.1" 0 The problem is further exacerbated by the
.increasingly sophisticated nature of current economic activity, which
employs fictitious entities such as corporations or trusts and involves transactions with significant contacts with several jurisdictions simultaneously.
Most jurisdictions have long ago opted for territoriality, leaving open only
the question of which version to adopt: narrow territoriality or extraterritoriality."'I
Against this backdrop, American case law, for example, gradually
began to apply a rather flexible criterion upon which authority to regulate
economic workings in the inter-sphere can be divided among jurisdictions.
Most notable in this context is the "effects test," which calls upon courts to
105. See Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388-89 (2005); EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949).
106. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975) ...
whether Congress would have wished the precious resources of United States courts and
law enforcement agencies to be devoted to [predominantly foreign claims] rather than
leave the problem to foreign countries").
107. See Kahn, supra note 31, at 370.
108. See Curtis A. Bradley, TerritorialIntellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 508-09, 550-62 (1997).
109. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 458-59 (2007).
110. See RAUSTALA, supra note 84, at 8-9 (discussing the relative relevance of the "flat
world" thesis, according to which "political boundaries matter little and economic and
social forces move freely").
111. See RAUSTLkA, supra note 84, at 95-125 (discussing the broader ideological
background against which "extraterritoriality" evolved-e.g., the rise of the regulatory
state).
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apply U.S. regulations whenever a foreign conduct causes effects in the
United States" 2 The effects test has been applied in various contexts of
economic regulation. 1 13 For example, the effects test has been employed in
the antitrust context, beginning in the courts" 4 and later Congress, as it
enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, which
holds that U.S. antitrust law does not apply to "conduct involving trade or
commerce .

.

. with foreign nations unless . . . such conduct has a direct,

substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" in the United States."15
However, an alternative approach can also be pursued, as the United
States recently demonstrated. With regard to securities antifraud regulation legislation, lower courts in the United States applied the effects test,
which requires proof of direct and substantial domestic effects before the
U.S. antifraud laws can be applied, to decide whether U.S. law regulates
transnational cases.11 6 However, in the famous Morrison case, a rather
surprising turn of events occurred. Despite a continuous, decades-long
effort by the Courts of Appeals to devise decision-making principles that
differ from the narrow version of the territorial criterion, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided to abandon not only the effects test but also any other criteria upon which the territorial criterion in this context could be structured
and instead reiterated its commitment to a narrow version of
territoriality.117
112. See, e.g., Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality'sFifth Business, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1457-58 (2008) (explaining the test and noting that "[alt the heart
of most extraterritoriality cases lies the effects test"). Of course, courts have employed
on occasion yet another notable test-the "conduct test." See Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) (introducing the conduct
test). Still, for the purpose of the current paper and exposition of its argument, it is
sufficient to juxtapose the Morrison ruling with the "effects test." Both tests, however,
reflect a longstanding American position also incorporated in Sections 402 and 403 of
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.
113. See Parrish, supra note 112 (detailing the contexts and referring to authorities).
114. See Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962);
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243
U.S. 66, 88 (1917); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir.
1945).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(I)(A) (2012); see also F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993);
William S. Dodge, An Economic Defense of ConcurrentAntitrustJurisdiction, 38 TEx. INT'L
LJ. 27, 27-28 (2003); Andrew T. Guzman, Is InternationalAntitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1501, 1506-08 (1998); Larry Kramer, Comment, ExtraterritorialApplication of
American Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and
Trimble, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 750, 752 (1995); Christopher Sprigman, Fix Prices Globally,
Get Sued Locally? U.S. Jurisdiction over International Cartels, 72 U. Cm. L. REv. 265
(2005).
116. See, e.g., Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998);
Robinson v. TCI/USW W. Commc'ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1997); Consol.
Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1989); Zoelsch v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 991 (2d Cir. 1975); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,
206-08 (2d Cir. 1968).
117. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010).
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The approach taken by the Supreme Court in Morrison is narrower
than any effects test approach because any cases in which the plaintiff can
establish effects on the U.S. economy will not be regulated by American
law-even if the claim is filed in a U.S. court""-if the transaction was
executed abroad and does not concern securities listed on a U.S. exchange.
This result holds even if the fraudulent behavior has a substantial effect on
the U.S. economy or emerges out of conduct that occurred in the United
States. However, the Morrison approach can also be broader than any
effects test because it can lead to the application of U.S. law to cases that
concern securities transactions executed in the United States but that do
not have any significant effects on the United States. In this sense, the
narrow territoriality criterion is a more rigid criterion than the effects test
criterion.
The Morrison case and the Court's renewed commitment to a narrow
territorial criterion left analysts (or should have left them)1 19 somewhat
baffled. In a modern and globalized world, it is not easy to explain a narrow territorial approach if it is applied to "phenomena that do not respect
territorial boundaries."1 20 Moreover, extra-territoriality has considerable
benefits for a power such as the United States,'21 in addition to mitigating
the costs associated with refraining from regulating foreign activities that
affect U.S. markets. 122 Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to
replace the rather understandable 123 extra-territorial approach with a self118. Note that the lawsuit may be filed abroad and that the foreign court may choose
to apply U.S. law. The foreign court makes its decisions unilaterally without necessarily
considering the U.S. position on the issue.
119. See, e.g., RAUSTIALA, supra note 84, at 125 (noting the discussion written before
the Supreme Court rendered the Morrison decision: "(Tloday effects-based extraterritoriality is no longer questioned in its fundamentals, nor is it a purely American phenomenon. Some version of the effects principle has been adopted by most major powers
around the world . . . .").
120. See Michaels, supra note 103, at 541.
121. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 84 at 7, 224, 230 (emphasizing the incentives to display an extraterritorial approach and the advantages of such an approach); Meyer, supra
note 31, at 112 (emphasizing strategic advantages to the United States from
extraterritoriality).
122. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Remedies for Foreign Investors Under U.S. Federal
Securities Law, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 163 (2012) (noting that the Morrison rule

applied not only to "foreign cubed" cases but also "across the board, including in cases
in which the U.S. regulatory interest is significantly stronger (such as those involving the
foreign transactions of U.S. rather than foreign investors), or the conflict with other
regimes significantly milder (such as those involving individual rather than class
claims"); Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud
Protection in an Internationalized Securities Marhetplace, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241,
245 (1992) (highlighting the importance of protecting against the effects of global securities transactions in the U.S., and describing this rationale as a "most compelling" justification for the extra-territorial application of U.S. regulation).
123. See Parrish, supra note 112, at 1458-59 & note 13 (noting that the effects test
was not only perceived as modem by commentators, but that it has also gained the
support of several other jurisdictions, which began to apply it as well). Other jurisdictions that have adopted some version of the extra-territoriality rule include Germany,
France, Australia, and Denmark. See Jiurgen Basedow & Stefan L. Pankoke, General
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imposed narrow test.1 24 Why?' 2 5 Conventional explanations focus on the
issue of certainty and predictability, and most scholars have argued that by
receding to a narrow territoriality, the United States responded to the complaints of exaggerated extraterritoriality raised by other jurisdictions.12 6
II. The Case of the Derivative Action
This portion of the discussion attempts to implement in the context of
the derivative action mechanism the insights gathered with regard to the
conflict-of-laws doctrines discussed in Part 1. The goal is to develop a
framework for deciding which law-forum law or the relevant foreign law
(lex incorporationis12 7 )-should regulate the terms and conditions under
which a derivative action is to be filed before courts of the forum on behalf
of a foreign corporation. To emphasize my arguments, I shall employ as a
stylized example a case demonstrating a conflict-of-laws between a local
law that allows a derivative action and a foreign law that does not.12 8
A. Why Lex IncorporationisShould Not Always Be Applied
One could argue that in cases in which a derivative action is filed
before the forum court on behalf of a foreign corporation, the terms of the
derivative action mechanism, as well as the basic entitlement to file this
unique civil lawsuit (as opposed to the cause-of-action upon which the suit
is brought' 2 9), should be exclusively regulated by the lex incorporationisi.e., the foreign law-and not by the law of the forum.
1.

The Incorporation Bargain

The most important reason, one could argue, is simple: it is all about
Report, in LIMITS AND CONTROL OF COMPETITION WITH A VIEW TO INTERNATIONAL HARMONI-

ZATION 1, 27-29 Uuargen Basedow, ed., 2002).

124. For a reading of another Supreme Court decision that echoes a narrow territorial
approach, see Michaels, supra note 103, at 536, 538-41 (analyzing F. Hoffmann-La
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004)).
125. For another line of reasoning, of a realist nature, see Larry Kramer, Vestiges of
Beale: ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law, 1991 SuP. CT. REv. 179, 202 (1991)
(arguing that the presumption against extraterritoriality masks judicial resentment of
congressional regulation).
126. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and
Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 465, 467 (2009). See also
Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applauding
the Supreme Court's decision in this regard). This rationale, which was also endorsed
by several foreign governments that submitted amicus briefs to the court, highlights the
possible negative effect that unpredictability may have on foreign investors' activities
and investments in the United States because the exposure to liability has become
uncertain.
127. See supra note 16 (for reasons of convenience ignoring the question of applying
lex incorporationisversus applying the law of the real seat).
128. See supra note 12 (providing relevant examples).
129. While the cause of action may also be regulated by the lex incorporationis,and
often is, in fact, regulated in such manner, the discussion of this choice-of-law question
is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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enforcing contracts and keeping promises.1 30 When deciding to incorporate abroad, rather than in the forum state (although the latter may, in fact,
be the corporate entity's primary place of business), investors take upon
themselves an entire set of contractual obligations.' 3 1 It is a contract
woven through the integration and interaction between the corporate
entity's charter and bylaws and the foreign laws in the state of incorporation. In fact, in as much as the corporate entity's bylaws do not specifically
address a particular issue-including the entitlement to commence a derivative action-the law of the state of incorporation becomes the source of
relevant default terms to be included in any contract. The investors choosing to incorporate in a particular foreign jurisdiction can be assumed to
have performed so after "shopping around," comparing the various laws of
several jurisdictions to find their best fit.13 2 Obviously, promises should be
kept and contracts should be enforced. Thus, if the contract undertaken
by the corporate entity's shareholders included an agreement that derivative action shall not be available as a remedy-even if such a covenant was
included only as a default term supplied by the law of the state of incorporation-this agreement should be upheld. Indeed, had it been the other
way around, and the foreign law of incorporation would have extended a
relevant entitlement or protection to these shareholders (even in the context
of the derivative action mechanism), these investors would no doubt argue
for application of the foreign corpus of laws and not for the application of
the law of the forum.
To complete the circle and maintain cohesion with conflict-of-laws
doctrine, note that this contractual argument is a policy consideration that
would serve to influence the choice-of-law decision, notwithstanding the
conflict-of-laws methodology adopted by the relevant forum. In jurisdictions that adhere to the "traditional" choice-of-law methodology (which
relies on characterization, discovering the related connecting factor, and
later localizing it to derive the applicable law), this policy consideration
would serve to opt for lex incorporationis as the connecting factor. Conversely, in jurisdictions that adhere to the modern choice-of-law methodology (such as the theories of the Most Significant Relationship or
Governmental Interest Analysis), a policy consideration would be
employed ad hoc to influence the choice of applicable law within the confines of these theories.' 33
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the contractual argument cannot
justify application of lex incorporationisto all cases. Indeed, the contractual argument is exposed to two lines of criticism.
130. See also Ehud Kamar, Catch Me If You Can, GLOBES (Sept. 6, 2011) (articulating
this rationale).
131. Cf., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 15-22 (1991).
132. See Kersting, supra note 11, at 10-11.
133. See generally CURRIE ET AL., supra note 4 (discussing and comparing the traditional and modem methodologies).
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The first critique addresses the nature of consent to the contract in
question. While it is well accepted that agreements should usually be
enforced,13 4 in the corporate context a relevant concern is the existence of
informed consent. When investors decide to incorporate in a certain jurisdiction, one could correctly note that they agree to undertake the complete
package of obligations accompanying the foreign incorporation, some features of which may prove to have a wealth-decreasing effect in the future.
As long as investors are aware of the pertinent risks and are, nonetheless,
willing to accept these risks, they should be bound to their contract once
any risk materializes. However, if investors are unaware of all the terms of
the contract, the contractual argument becomes significantly less convincing. The problem with the contractual package to which investors commit
as they execute the act of foreign incorporation is that there is serious
doubt whether investors are in fact fully aware of the various legal nuances
included in the package. 3 5 Moreover, unlike the package deriving from a
local incorporation, with regard to which local investors often have an accumulated body of knowledge and past experience, the set of contractual
terms deriving from a foreign incorporation is sometimes a mystery for
certain investors. In particular, such investor ignorance is likely with
regard to contractual terms, the relevance of which is variable, in the sense
that any particular set of terms may or may not become important in the
future. In short, when incorporating abroad, investors may be interested in
and aware of immediately pending tax benefits but unaware of the terms
for filing a derivative action should the corporation be wronged at some
point in the future (if at all).1 36
The second criticism concerns the scope of party autonomy. While
the existence of a contractual agreement between the relevant parties
regarding the choice of applicable law is by itself a powerful argument justifying the enforcement of such an agreement, one could harbor doubt as to
whether the parties were originally entitled to agree on the matter. indeed,
when parties appear before the forum court (and one of them is) arguing in
favor of a contractual agreement that implicates the choice-of-law inquiry
conducted by the court, caution is advised. It is well known that not all
forms and contexts of choice-of-law are open to private parties to contract
about.' 3 7 Indeed, several choice-of-law contexts are highly regulated and
may implicate an important public interest such that the parties are not
134. See Michael T. Janik & Margaret C. Rhodes, A Review of Recent Decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Gould, Inc. v. United States: Contractor Claims for Relief Under Illegal Contracts with the Government, 45 AM. U.L. REv.
1949, 1950 (1996).
135. See generally DEBORAH A. DEMOTr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE AcTIONs: LAW AND
PRACTICE 2-3, 38-39 (2011) (explaining the legal complexities and forum-selection
intricacies of derivative action cases).
136. See id. at 207-08, 214-15 (detailing the numerous possibilities of considerations made in choice of law standards as these standards apply to derivative actions).
137. See, e.g.,

PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS

46, 53-54, 57, 59

(1999); Giesela Rihl, Party Autonomy in the Private InternationalLaw of Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZED
WORLD 153, 160 (Eckart Gottschalk et al. eds., 2007); Mo Zhang, Party Autonomy and
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allowed to contract around the forum's preferred choice-of-law. In the
United States, for example, contexts in which the forum has a significant
public interest in regulating the matter-such as contexts involving market
failures that implicate markets in the forum's jurisdiction-are usually not
characterized by the forum as "internal affairs" of the corporate entity and
are, therefore, removed from the sphere of application of the lex
38
incorporationis.1

Moreover, it has already been argued, particularly in the area of corporate law, that allowing investors to evade the law with the greatest interest
in regulating their behavior, or the law with which they have the most
important contacts, by straightforwardly applying lex incorporationis to
regulate their "internal affairs" is illegitimate both in terms of efficiency
and of democracy.1 39 Such illegitimacy emerges due to the ease with
which corporate entities can incorporate in any foreign jurisdiction in combination with the rather wide array of issues that come under the definition of "internal affairs," including many issues that affect various
stakeholders.14 0
Consider a stylized example. While forum law entertains the option to
engage in a derivative action, lex incorporationis rules out that form of
action altogether. However, suppose the corporate entity in question is one
that had incorporated in the foreign jurisdiction but all relevant parties,
including its shareholders and officers, are residents of the forum. Suppose further that the forum is interested in deterring officers, directors,
and controlling shareholders from employing corporate mechanisms and
vehicles (including foreign ones) to prejudice investors unfairly (by breaching fiduciary duties owed to the corporate entity) or stakeholders and particularly weak stakeholders (by employing disputed corporate practices,
such as maximizing only shareholders' profits instead of stakeholders' welfare or generally maximizing the corporate entity's profits). The forum
may be interested in maintaining the regulation of such defendants outside
the scope of party autonomy, excluding the possibility that these defendants would be able to contract their way out of being sued. The forum may
also be interested in doing so not only for the purpose of protecting stakeholders but simply to prevent a foreign jurisdiction from reaching beyond
its borders to influence activities inside the forum jurisdiction because
residents of the forum cannot politically influence the rules of corporate

Beyond: An International Perspective of ContractualChoice of Law, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV.

511, 524 (2006).
138. See DEMOrr, supra note 6, at 210; see, e.g., Friese v. Superior Court, 134 Cal.
App. 4th 693, 702, 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that a specific dispute regarding a
prohibition on insider trading is not to be characterized as "internal affairs" of a public
corporation).
139. See Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in CorporateLaw,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 135-36 (2004) (making this argument against the
backdrop of the modern American choice-of-law methodology).
140. See id. at 136-37.
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law enacted by the relevant foreign jurisdiction. 14 1 In corporate entities in
which agency problems severely trump any hope of the corporate entity
formally fighting on its own against its insiders, the only way for the forum
to accomplish the goal of deterrence, or minority shareholder or stakeholders' protection, would be to apply forum law instead of lex incorporationis
to the specific dispute concerning the entitlement to file a derivative action.
Otherwise, the goals of deterrence and protecting weakened investors and
stakeholders cannot be accomplished. To be sure, allowing lex incorporationis to regulate the derivative action mechanism amounts to extending
potential defendants with immunity or insurance even for acts that constitute a breach of fiduciary duties (or other non-insurable or non-indemnifiable duties).
Furthermore, recall that in some jurisdictions creditors, including
involuntary creditors, can also file a derivative action.142 In these jurisdictions, applying lex incorporationisto regulate the derivative action mechanism and the very entitlement to initiate derivative action severely damages
the protection afforded by the forum to such corporate stakeholders, who
may, in fact, become involved with the corporate entity involuntarily. In
those cases in which the corporate entity's main activity is within the
forum jurisdiction and its incorporation abroad was purely for tax purposes, for example, applying lex incorporationis to decide if a derivative
mechanism can be filed at all is tantamount to securing a process of externalization by corporate insiders of the costs of their activity on creditors.
In those jurisdictions, incorporating abroad can become a relatively comfortable tool employed by corporate insiders to opt out of local regulation.
Finally, even in the absence of creditors as potential plaintiffs in derivative actions, in the context of party autonomy, the forum is certainly
allowed to doubt the justice of allowing corporate insiders to evade liability
by pushing investors to incorporate in a jurisdiction with an inferior derivative action mechanism-inferior for plaintiffs, that is-to the mechanism
employed by local law. The reason is the possible initiation of a race to the
bottom.14 3 Indeed, in an ever-globalized world, opportunistic jurisdictions
can be easily found to offer foreign investors protections and benefits that
they cannot secure in their jurisdiction of origin. A unique form of race
would be engendered as foreign jurisdictions offer packages of investor
incentives (e.g., tax incentives) coupled with inferior investor protection
(e.g., lack of a derivative action mechanism). Such a package can attract
141. See id. at 137 (arguing that Delaware reaches beyond its borders in such a
manner).
142. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
143. Cf., e.g., David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities, 32 HARv. INT'L LJ. 423 (1991) (discussing the problem in general in the
context of the European Union); Jens Dammann & Matthias Schundeln, The Incorporation Choices of Privately Held Corporations,27 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 79, 80 (2011) (discussing the American race-to-the-bottom critique, which maintains that "state competition
produces a body of law that inefficiently benefits managers at the expense of shareholders"); Kersting, supra note 11, at 42 n.214 (citing European sources).
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investors to incorporate while protecting those who assume insider positions within the corporate entity. In fact, for a jurisdiction offering inferior
investor protection against insiders' malfeasance (e.g., in the form of immunity from derivate action), there appears to be no real cost associated with
such actions. Offering such a benefit for unscrupulous insiders would be
attractive for purposes of luring investors from the forum to incorporate in
the foreign host's jurisdiction. Thus, these investors from the forum's territory will pay corporate taxes to increase the foreign jurisdiction's budget,
while the costs of insiders' malfeasance would be solely borne by those
investors in the forum, due to the location of the corporate entity's primary
place of business.14 4 Indeed, the phenomenon of pseudo-foreign corporate
entities is well known: that is, local corporate entities whose only foreign
connection is the act of incorporating in a foreign jurisdiction.' 4 5 Even if
one were to claim that investors in pseudo-foreign corporate entities are
hardly victims of any externalization because they agree to the terms of the
corporate contract (which might, for example, exclude the possibility of
employing a derivative action mechanism), and even if one were to ignore a
possible externalization effect upon corporate stakeholders who have not
and cannot consent to the incorporation abroad, the forum may be interested not in the welfare of these investors but rather in securing a source of
income for itself. In other words, the reason for attempting to block competition from other jurisdictions may be a public interest in having investors "stay at home" and pay taxes in the forum rather than incorporate
abroad.
2.

Derivative Action as a Remedy

Lex incorporationis may be excluded for another reason: an institutional one. The specific dispute, with regard to which a choice-of-law decision is required, concerns the terms for filing a derivative action, not the
cause of action itself. In other words, the choice-of-law question requires
the court to choose a mechanism to manage the filing of a derivative
action. One could expect that the forum court would resist any attempt to
impose upon it a foreign mechanism. For example, one could argue that
the substance-procedure doctrine should be employed to generate a decision that would rule out foreign law in this context and would adhere
solely to the law of the forum, at least for the purpose of protecting the
local court from being unduly burdened and inconvenienced by the need
to apply the foreign law.14 6 To illustrate the possible power of this argu144. Cf.
CORRUPTING

LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 17-18 (2006) (describing a situation where Dela-

ware's corporate-friendly bankruptcy proceedings forced other states to change their
bankruptcy proceedings as well in order to compete).
145. See Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations,65 YALE L.J. 137, 137 (1955)
(defining such a corporate entity as a local entity, the business and personnel of which

are predominantly associated with the forum jurisdiction while the entity itself is incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction).
146. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing this rationale in the context of the substanceprocedure distinction).
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ment, consider a slight modification to our working example. Suppose the
specific dispute involves an entitlement to file a class action lawsuit rather
than a derivative action lawsuit. In such a case, the forum should at least
fear the possibility of applying a foreign law that would exclude class
actions because then the forum may instead be burdened by a large number of individual lawsuits that are filed due to the absence of a class action
path.
Should a similar burdening consideration be employed with regard to
the derivative action? The answer appears to be yes.
One needs to understand that the situation that will generate this
question has two variations. Indeed, the burdening argument may be
evoked not only when the law of the forum is more lenient for plaintiffs
than the foreign lex incorporationis.Had it been the other way around, with
lex incorporationisallowing a derivative action when such is disallowed by
the lex for, the plaintiff would have argued for the application of lex
incorporationis(assuming that the plaintiff could not file the action in that
foreign jurisdiction to begin with). In such a case, however, defendants
would probably argue for application of the law of the forum and cite as a
reason the expected imposition upon the forum court of an unfamiliar
derivative action mechanism and perhaps even of allowing a derivative
action when such litigation patterns do not exist in the forum.
However, there appears to be an asymmetry created between plaintiffs
and defendants because each calls for the application of lex fori instead of
lex incorporationis. In the extreme case of a foreign law that completely
excludes the possibility of filing a derivative action, applying such a law is
not expected to engender any imposition upon the court system of the
forum. The reason is that unlike a class action mechanism, which is a horizontal litigation mechanism substituting for a set of personal claims, the
derivative action is a vertical mechanism. Specifically, the derivative action
does not substitute a bulk of personal claims but rather expands the group
of plaintiffs that are entitled to litigate a particular cause of action that
belongs to the corporate entity. It is true that the derivative action mechanism does add one more type of plaintiff (either a shareholder, or-as in
some jurisdictions-even a creditor) to the list of possible plaintiffs. However, in the opposite extreme case in which the lex fori is the one that
excludes a derivative action while lex incorporationisentertains that option,
applying lex incorporationismay, in fact, burden the courts in the forum
jurisdiction because they would be required to adjudicate questions with
which they are unfamiliar, such as when a particular plaintiff is entitled to
file a derivative action and on what terms she may file.

To conclude, the decision with regard to the choice of a derivative
action mechanism (a choice which is the result of choosing the law applicable to a specific dispute concerning any of the terms for commencing a
derivative action) is not one-dimensional, as some might argue. Indeed,
one suggestion is to refrain from a general acceptance of the proposition
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that the choice of investors to incorporate abroad should unequivocally
subject them to the application of the law of incorporation on all matters
concerning intra-firm relations. The decision of which law to apply is
more nuanced.
B. The Correct Framing
Because the choice of a law to regulate the derivative action mechanism is not an obvious one, a preliminary question that must be addressed
concerns the appropriate legal framework within which the pertinent policy discussion should take place. In other words, the question is which
conflict-of-laws doctrine should serve as a platform or a focal point for
resolving the choice-of-law problem discussed in this paper. Answering
this question is necessary because it may help us understand and perhaps
even shape the dynamics of judicial decision-making when such a choiceof-law question presents itself.
From a practical standpoint, because the choice-of-law rule with
regard to "internal affairs" of the corporation points to applying lex
incorporationis,one can expect that even if the court would be inclined to
characterize the specific dispute concerning the derivative action mechanism as a matter of "internal affairs," the party opposing the result of
applying a foreign lex incorporationiswould no doubt evoke one of the relevant "escape hatches"-either the public policy doctrine or the substanceprocedure distinction. A third doctrine that may be invoked to serve as the
framework for discussion, this time by a party favoring application of the
lex incorporationis,is the presumption against extraterritoriality (when the
relevant local statute is silent on its application to foreign corporations)
because the presumption would effectively serve to limit the extraterritorial
application of a silent-on-its-transnational-reach forum law.
One could argue that these three doctrines are not meant to replace
one another and each has its own fundamental rationale. 14 7 However,
because the choice-of-law decision is relatively policy-oriented and because
policy considerations can actually be invoked in any context, it appears
reasonable to assume that the court would focus on one of these doctrines
to resolve the choice-of-law query.' 4 8 Notwithstanding, one may wonder
which doctrine, if any, fits best that task of adjudicating the choice-of-law
question.
From a choice-of-law methodology viewpoint, I argue that the public
policy doctrine appears to be the better platform to resolve disputes concerning the applicability of a local derivative action mechanism when such
lawsuits are filed on behalf of foreign corporations.
The substance-procedure doctrine appears de-facto to have excluded
itself from being chosen as the relevant framework. In jurisdictions that
147. See supra Part I (discussing these rationales).
148. The discussion will proceed along the lines of traditional choice-of-law methodology because in the context of a modem choice-of-law methodology, courts are already
well-prepared to conduct a policy-oriented choice-of-law inquiry and actually are in less
need of "escape devices" to pursue substantive policies.
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follow the traditional choice-of-law methodology, which is based on neutrality-i.e., the forum strongly attempts to refrain from any inclination
towards either the forum law or the foreign law-the substance-procedure
doctrine has been demonstrated to be quite problematic. Part I of this
paper revealed that while the distinction between substance and procedure
cannot be executed in an a priori manner without a rationale to drive it, as
the line between substance and procedure is very indistinct and from a
purely jurisprudential viewpoint may not even exist, the substance-procedure doctrine cannot handle just any rationale and actually must be carefully harnessed. Indeed, once lawmakers attempt to employ the substanceprocedure distinction to promote any policy consideration which comes to
their mind-as seems to have happened in certain jurisdictions t4 9 -the
road becomes much shorter to making the substance-procedure distinction
a "back door" through which the law of the forum would be excessively
applied.
The Presumption against Extraterritoriality also does not appear to be
a very good platform when applied to the specific choice-of-law question
presented here. The reason lies in this doctrine's relatively rigid and arbitrary nature. The Presumption against Extraterritoriality works well when,
on the one hand, statutes are silent on their application to transnational
cases, and on the other hand, local regulation has a tendency to spread
excessively to transnational cases. However, in the context of the derivative
action mechanism, there appears to be no specific problem of excessive
extraterritoriality, due to the rather clear-cut choice-of-law rule that applies
lex incorporationis-whichis a foreign law for foreign corporations-to regulate the "internal affairs" of foreign-incorporated entities. Furthermore,
when the forum has a derivative mechanism legislation that specifically
articulates its applicability in the transnational context, the presumption
against extraterritoriality becomes irrelevant.
In contrast, the public policy doctrine serves as a context in which the
forum can "put his foot down" and express intolerance for an applicable
but offensive foreign law. This doctrine is, therefore, an exception to the
rule. More importantly, the public policy doctrine is shaped and litigated
in practice as an exception because the question judges ask themselves
when employing it is whether application of the foreign law is sufficiently
unbearable that the doctrine must be invoked to apply the law of the forum
instead of the applicable foreign law. Even if the judge is only mildly cautious, she would be inclined to refrain from employing the public policy
doctrine to apply the law of the forum instead of the foreign law.
Moreover, as was described in Part 1, in recent years the doctrine's
open texture is beginning to take form along certain predictable vectors,
such as proximity, relativity and seriousness of breach.15 0 The adoption of
these vectors contains the doctrine and streamlines it so that it performs in
149. See supra note 66 and the accompanying text (discussing U.K. and Israeli law).
150. See supra note 73.
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practice as an exception only, thereby allowing a more free application of
foreign law.
How do these general developments in conflict-of-laws doctrine relate
to the choice-of-law question as it is related to the derivative action mechanism in the case of a foreign corporation? The discussion thus far revealed
that when the corporate entity in question is incorporated in a foreign
jurisdiction, application of lex incorporationisto regulate the derivative
action mechanism should still be the rule in many cases. Indeed, in certain cases, the forum would justifiably prefer to apply its own law over the
lex incorporationis (only to regulate the derivative action mechanism, of
course, not the cause-of-action against the defendants). Without a doubt,
however, these cases are, and should be, only an exception. The public
policy doctrine, with its built-in-exception mentality and evolving limiting
vectors, fits perfectly as a platform to adjudicate this choice-of-law
question.
C. The Irrelevance of Forum Shopping
Notwithstanding its precise doctrinal framework-whether it is the
substance-procedure distinction, the public policy doctrine, or the presumption against extraterritoriality-the decision regarding choice of law
regulating the derivative action mechanism should, nevertheless, be
resolved in accordance with certain policy considerations. Most of these
considerations have already been discussed. 15 1
The most important policy consideration without a doubt focuses on
giving investors-for better or worse-what they bargained for. This consideration will usually prevail and lead to the application of the foreign law
of incorporation, even if, from the perspective of a potential plaintiff, the
meaning completely denies her the option of filing a derivative action.
However, this consideration may take a wholly different form if parties do
not actually demonstrate consent, for example, if the plaintiffs are involuntary creditors or if the forum decides that the consent was not sufficiently
informed according to a standard the forum believes appropriate.
Another important consideration would focus on coping with possible
market failures created and felt at the forum as a result of applying the
foreign law of incorporation to regulate the derivative action mechanism.
The existence of such failures may direct the forum to refrain from applying the foreign law of incorporation and instead apply the law of the forum
as a corrective measure.
However, what policy considerations should not be taken into account
and should not influence the choice-of-law decision?
One notable and, importantly, irrelevant consideration is forum shopping. In the area of conflict-of-laws, forum shopping is an unwarranted
151. See supra Part IIA.
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phenomenon.15 2 Selfish plaintiffs who seek to take advantage of conducting litigation in a certain jurisdiction rather than in a more obvious
and expected one manipulate the process, curtail efforts to minimize litigation costs, and disrupt attempts by jurisdictions to attract litigation.
However, the question is whether application of lex incorporationis
should be included as a measure in the battle against forum shopping
plaintiffs. The underlying rationale is to deter plaintiffs from forum shopping by making sure that the law that was originally intended to regulate
their relationship with the defendants would "follow" them to whichever
forum they choose.
Still, jurisdictional doctrines, mainly the Forum Non Conveniens doctrine, can discourage forum-shopping behavior.1 53 Therefore, courts do
not necessarily need to turn to the choice-of-law of process, which is
already sufficiently complicated, to deter such behavior.
Moreover, forum shopping for some plaintiffs serves a purpose other
than evading the substantive regulating law. These plaintiffs attempt to
escape their home court when it is known for being pro-defendant, particularly with regard to either intangible aspects of the litigation (e.g., a court's
reluctance to encourage, or even hostility toward, certain forms of lawsuits)
or specific disputes that are traditionally known to be regulated by local
law (e.g., standard of proof, attorneys' fees, or trial costs). For example, in
Delaware the courts' inclination to harness attorneys' fees or police plaintiff behavior by imposing stricter pleading standards caused plaintiffs systematically to seek other venues in which to file derivative lawsuits.15 4 For
these plaintiffs, application of a foreign law is hardly a deterring measure,
as long as they are allowed to proceed and adjudicate their claim before the
forum.
Furthermore, in the context of corporate litigation, most lawsuits
emerge against a contractual background. In other words, some form of
contract-either a shareholder agreement or a corporate charter and
bylaws-already binds the plaintiff and the defendant. Thus, one can
expect that potential defendants in derivative actions would anticipate in
advance the possibility of being hauled into a foreign forum and protect
themselves by including in the relevant contract a forum selection
clause. 15 5 Such a clause would accord exclusive jurisdiction to a court in
the jurisdiction in which the corporate entity has incorporated (or any
jurisdiction, for that matter) and resolve any pending problem of forum
shopping.
152. See ANDREW S. BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION
18-20 (2003); MICHAEL MOUSA KARAYANNI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE MODERN AGE:
A COMPARATIVE AND METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 17, 34 (2004).
153. See, e.g., KARAYANNI, supra note 152.
154. See, e.g., Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of
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In short, the focus with regard to discouraging forum-shopping behavior should be on employing jurisdictional doctrines, rather than choice-oflaw doctrines.
Conclusion
This Article takes a comparative approach to analyzing the manner in
which a choice of a law to regulate derivative actions against foreign corporations should be made. The main theme was the rejection of an approach
that considers the choice-of-law process to be a one-dimensional decisionmainly to enforce upon investors the law of the foreign state of incorporation, allegedly as part of the deal that they made when they became shareholders in such a corporation. Indeed, the choice-of-law decision is more
complex. The Article explained why the relevant platform for discussions
should be the public policy doctrine and discussed possible considerations
to be taken into account in this context.

